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Population matters. Demography is both a cause and a consequence of human behaviour in 
other important domains, such as subsistence, cooperation, politics and culture. Demographers 
interested in contemporary and recent historical populations have rich data at their fingertips; 
the importance of demography means many interested parties have gathered demographic 
data, much of which is now readily available for all to explore. Those interested in the 
demography of the distant past are not so fortunate, given the lack of written records. 
Nevertheless, the emergence in recent years of a new interest in the demography of ancient 
populations has seen the development of a range of new methods for piecing together 
archaeological, skeletal and DNA evidence to reconstruct past population patterns. These efforts 
have found evidence in support of the view that the relatively low long-term population growth 
rates of prehistoric human populations, albeit ultimately conditioned by carrying capacities, may 
have been due to ‘boom-bust’ cycles at the regional level; rapid population growth, followed by 
population decline. In fact, this archaeological research may have come to the same conclusion 
as some contemporary demographers: that demography can be remarkably hard to predict, at 
least in the short term. It also fits with evidence from biology that primates, and particularly 
humans, may be adapted to environmental variability, leading to associated demographic 
stochasticity. This evidence of the fluctuating nature of human demographic patterns may be of 
considerable significance in understanding our species’ evolution, and of understanding what 




Population patterns are fundamental to human history. In the last 200 years the key process has 
been the ‘demographic transition’ [1]. Economic and social changes led to decreasing mortality, 
while fertility continued at the previous high levels for some time before eventually decreasing. 
The result of that intervening period has been a wave of global population increase that started 
in Britain and has spread across the world as the conditions for decreased mortality have 
become increasingly widespread. 
In the context of the political and economic history of the last 200 years the demographic 
patterns can be seen as long-term features with massive inertia, but archaeological time-scales 
are much longer and can potentially tell us about multiple demographic events connected with 
changes in human adaptations. Indeed, his recognition of this was at the heart of Childe’s [2] 
concept of the Neolithic and Urban Revolutions (cf. [3]). The only graph in his book was one of 
the population of Britain, 1500-1850, showing the upswing in population between 1750 and 
1850 associated with the Industrial Revolution, which ‘facilitated the survival and multiplication 
of the species concerned’. He went on to suggest that it was possible to ‘discern in earlier ages 
of human history other “revolutions”. They manifest themselves in the same way as the 
“Industrial Revolution” — in an upward kink in the population curve’. In other words, these new 
strategies were successful in natural selection terms for those who adopted them. Binford’s [4] 
argument about the agricultural revolution was rather different. He proposed that populations 
that had become sedentary as a result of exploiting plant resources at the end of the last Ice Age 
were effectively forced into cultivation as their population expanded, at the expense of 
diminishing returns for increased effort, but his argument was more in keeping with Ester 
Boserup’s [5] emphasis on ‘population pressure’ as a problem that needed a solution, rather 
than that the population growth associated with a strategy was an indicator of its success.  
Neo-evolutionists like Service [6] argued that one of the problems posed by larger populations, 
especially larger group sizes, was solved by the development of ‘managerial elites’ to organise 
them. In a more dystopian vein, Carneiro’s ‘circumscription theory’ [7] proposed that societies 
whose room for expansion was limited in some way would eventually feel pressure on resources 
that would lead to warfare between different groups and the ultimate victory of a single group 
that would incorporate the others in a new form of organisation. 
Such population ‘prime mover’ arguments fell out of favour when it was pointed out that the 
populations of foraging societies had apparently been conditioned by density-dependent 
mechanisms determined by the carrying capacity of their resources for thousands of years, so it 
had to be explained what had suddenly changed. Given that even low rates of exponential 
growth lead to massive increases in population over timescales that are very short by 
archaeological standards, population pressure, in the sense of density-dependent equilibrium at 
carrying capacity, must always have been present and therefore could not be an explanation for 
specific developments like the origins of agriculture (e.g. [8, 9]). Of course, this does not mean 
that population size and political centralisation may not sometimes be linked (see [10]). 
Archaeological demography today 
In Childe’s time the evidence for the ‘upward kinks’ in the population curve that characterised 
his revolutions was thin to say the least but in the 85 years since it is notable that archaeologists 
have until recently paid relatively little attention to the detailed documentation of demographic 
patterns, despite the ongoing centrality of population-centred accounts of change in prehistory. 
Indeed, many archaeologists have thought that tracing population patterns with archaeological 
evidence was an insuperably difficult task. The papers in this volume are represent of a renewed 
interest in demographic patterns and processes and their relation to cultural change on the part 
of archaeologists that has developed over the last 25 years, together with an associated 
recognition of the importance of testing models with data. There are several reasons for this 
renewed interest and all of them are reflected in this issue.  
On the theoretical side, a major one has been the growing awareness on the part of 
archaeologists of developments in ecological evolutionary demography, and life history theory 
in particular. These have revealed the detailed mechanisms at the level of the individual woman 
and the individual family that affect fertility and the successful recruitment of children to the 
next generation. A major influence on archaeological perceptions of these mechanisms was the 
late Jean-Pierre Bocquet-Appel’s idea of the Neolithic Demographic Transition (NDT [11],  
anticipated by [12]). By analogy with the modern demographic transition, he argued that the 
development of agricultural modes of existence led to a major shift in human fertility-mortality 
schedules. In contrast to the modern transition, this was led by changes in fertility rather than 
mortality because increased female energy levels resulting from decreased mobility and the 
increased availability of carbohydrates, led to higher fertility rates. But this would not be 
sufficient in itself unless it also resulted in increased recruitment. In fact, it seems that selection 
in humans strongly favours parental investment in existing young children over further fertility 
[13]. Kaplan et al.’s Tsimane study [14] showed that ‘transition to the next birth is affected by 
both energy stores and whether there is an existing living infant to invest in.’ So farming must 
also have improved recruitment as well, perhaps through decreased risk and better weaning 
foods, as well as better maternal energy balances. In keeping with this, ethnographic studies 
point to improvements in both fertility and recruitment with increased sedentism and 
involvement in horticultural/agricultural activities (e.g. [15]. In other words, agriculture enabled 
a shift in the quality-quantity trade-off in the costs and benefits of reproduction, increasing not 
just the number of children born but also the number that could be successfully raised. 
However, this sedentary existence created new infectious disease risks that may also have led to 
life histories in which there was a greater payoff to allocating more of a woman’s available 
energy to immune function and reproduction and less to growth and maintenance, explaining 
the often commented apparently paradoxical association of farming with population increase 
on the one hand and evidence of more disease and smaller achieved height on the other [16]. 
Regardless of whether archaeological data have sufficient time resolution to provide 
information at the micro-level of life-history decisions (see below), life history theory provides 
the theoretical underpinning for understanding the larger patterns in prehistory that 
archaeology can tell us about. Population growth, for example, becomes an indicator not of 
population pressure, as the 1960s view had it, but of a successful shift in the balance of trade-
offs towards increased fertility and recruitment based on the availability of increased resources, 
whether as a result of subsistence innovations, as in the case of the NDT, or environmental 
change. The long-term growth rate is an indication of the adaptive success of a population’s 
subsistence strategy in the prevailing conditions. Moreover, while locally a population will tend 
to reach a carrying capacity or ceiling, where birth and deaths are in Malthusian equilibrium, if 
space is available expansion can continue through emigration, as it did in the case of the 
European colonisation of the New World and that of Europe by early farmers of Anatolian 
ancestry [17]. However, it is better to see this in term of population ‘pull’ rather than population 
‘push’. In fitness terms it is an opportunity not a threat, because those who adopt the strategy 
will have increased reproductive success compared to those who do not. Importantly, because 
of their behavioural flexibility and the cultural nature of their adaptations, humans can expand 
into new environments relatively easily, unlike other primates. Indeed, this may often be easier 
than intensifying exploitation by means of increased labour inputs on the lines of the Boserup 
model. 
If Bocquet-Appel’s work on the demography of the origin and spread of farming was one source 
of a new interest in population patterns (e.g. [18]), another has been a growing concern with 
the historical impact of past climate change on human populations and its role in civilizational 
collapse (e.g. [19]).  From a different direction altogether, the ongoing twenty-year old debate 
about the relationship between population size and the rate of cultural evolution has also had 
an important influence on research, represented here by several papers. This debate arose for 
two main reasons. First, the mathematical formulation of cultural transmission processes by 
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman [20] and Boyd and Richerson [21], which had been considered 
irrelevant by the processual archaeologists of the 1960s to 80s, showed that transmission 
processes could have a major impact on patterns of cultural change and stability. Second, 
recognition of the piecemeal nature of cultural developments in the late Pleistocene [22] 
undermined existing cognitive-genetic explanations of the increased technological complexity of 
the Upper Palaeolithic and Late Stone Age. The impact of population fluctuations on cultural 
transmission provided an alternative [23]. Archer’s paper in this volume [24] makes a major 
advance in addressing this problem empirically by showing that in late Pleistocene Africa the 
incidence of backed stone artefacts (components of complex tools/weapons) is associated with 
inferred higher population densities themselves affected by climate change. Conversely, 
Lundström et al.’s study of final Palaeolithic demography in southern Scandinavia [25] points to 
a link between low population levels and cultural loss, while Strassberg and Creanza’s overview 
[26] shows ways forward in addressing the different results and conclusions of different studies 
of the cultural complexity-demography relationship.  
All the topics mentioned above may be regarded as theoretical drivers of the new interest in 
palaeodemography, but the availability of new sources of information and the development of 
new techniques has also changed perceptions. Thus, Bocquet-Appel tested his NDT hypothesis 
by showing how information about the age-at-death distribution of buried individuals from 
excavated cemeteries could be used to show that samples from cemeteries of Neolithic farmers, 
in contrast to those of Mesolithic foragers, contained high proportions of juvenile individuals, an 
indication that the populations from which they came were growing (see [27]). 
Of great importance here has been the explosion of ancient genomic DNA studies. These have 
frequently revealed massive shifts in the genomic composition of populations in different parts 
of the world implying that significant migrations must have taken place, raising the question of 
why these might have taken place. In doing so they have given support to other lines of 
demographic argument. Thus, ancient DNA analyses have shown that the initial spread of 
farming into Europe was the result of the expansion of a population of Anatolian ancestry [17], 
as noted above, resulting from their adoption of farming, in keeping with Bocquet-Appel’s 
model and also with his cemetery evidence of growing populations.  Vanderlinden and Silva in 
this volume [28] contribute to further understanding the way in which farmers and farming 
expanded into Europe by integrating information on speed of spread and population growth to 
show that it must have been a density-dependent dispersal process, even if many of the details 
remain to be understood. 
Finally, and more internal to their discipline, archaeologists have improved the resolution of 
their time scales through the use of techniques such as dendrochronology and the use of 
Bayesian methods incorporating contextual information to narrow the time intervals that can be 
derived from radiocarbon dates. Thus, when your units of time last for a millennium it is easy for 
populations to appear in equilibrium with their environments when this is not in fact the case 
(see below). 
All these different considerations have come together in, on the one hand, providing new 
questions whose answers depend on patterns in population history, and on the other new tools 
to address them, aided by a general explosion in the availability of archaeological data. A major 
battle within the discipline, especially in the last decade, has focussed on the reliability of one of 
those tools and data sets: the use of summed radiocarbon date probabilities (SPDs) and related 
measures such as kernel density estimates (KDEs) as a proxy for changing relative population 
sizes through time. These have the advantage over more traditional measures such as site 
counts that they provide better chronological resolution and that the chronological subdivisions 
over which data are aggregated are not determined by archaeologists’ artefact typologies. They 
are also very generally available, in ever-increasing quantities. Their disadvantages include the 
possibility of artefacts in the patterns resulting from the radiocarbon calibration curve, biases of 
various kinds in the selection and collection of samples, and the more general taphonomic 
problem affecting all such proxies that sites of some periods may have been preferentially 
destroyed or be more difficult to find than others.  
These debates have led to the continuing development of statistical tools to test the significance 
of claimed patterns of population rise and fall [29], and also to increasing comparison of 
inferences made on the basis of independent lines of evidence, for example pollen evidence for 
human impact on the landscape. These approaches and the contributions they can make to the 
understanding of long-term history and to justifying the validity of the methods themselves are 
strongly represented in this issue (e.g. [30-33]). For example, as Arroyo-Kalin and Riris [30] put it 
in their study of regional population patterns in Amazonia, ‘‘simply put, the size of human 
populations bears on how novel human niches are formed, how traditions of material culture 
evolve, why people intensify food production, and how new languages diversify within a 
language family.’ Of importance in a different way, Robinson et al. [34] show that the 
correspondence between radiocarbon and dendrochronological patterns in an area where both 
are available validates the use of summed radiocarbon probabilities as a demographic indicator 
of population collapse in areas where these are the only available data source. The paper by 
Timpson et al. [35], together with the associated software, represents the latest methodological 
development in the statistical analysis of summed radiocarbon probability distributions by 
identifying the maximum number of change points in a population trajectory that can be 
justifiably inferred from the information in a given dataset, and the dates at which they 
occurred, using a continuous piecewise linear model. This innovation avoids the danger of over-
interpreting the positive and negative departures from given growth models that exist with 
current methods. 
However, these radiocarbon-based approaches are not the only recent method for obtaining 
reliable population estimates for prehistory. The so-called ‘Cologne Protocol’ developed by 
Zimmermann and colleagues and represented here by the papers of Schmidt et al. [3] and 
Lundström et al. [25] takes a rigorously defined spatial approach at different scales, producing 
successive snapshots of scale-dependent population patterns that aim to estimate absolute and 
not just relative population densities. Moreover, like Timpson et al. [35], Schmidt et al. provide 
the computational tools to make their methods available; it can be anticipated that they will be 
widely taken up. 
Populations in flux 
What these methods have generally revealed when applied at the regional scale is evidence of 
population fluctuations, often very considerable ones. When farmers arrived in the various 
regions of Europe, for example, populations did not gradually rise to a new carrying capacity and 
stay there: the initial farming ‘booms’ were followed by ‘busts’. This was a surprise, because it 
contradicted assumptions of equilibrium that had been taken for granted on the basis of the 
coarse time-scales noted above. In some cases they could potentially be accounted for by 
adverse climate change (e.g. [36]), but by no means always. It is here that such empirical 
findings lead to theory again and to issues that remain to be resolved.  
Early computer modelling studies [37] showed that there was no guarantee that populations 
would grow smoothly to an equilibrium size in accordance with the logistic growth equation. 
Potentially, they could overshoot and end up oscillating. The oscillations could even increase in 
range, resulting in extinction. Moreover, demographic studies of present-day forager groups 
showed that they were expanding at very fast rates, incompatible with evidence that over the 
long term hunter-gatherer populations were at very low levels, the so-called ‘forager population 
paradox’, discussed here by French and Chamberlain [38] and Tallavaara et al. [33]. The former 
also draw attention to another paradox in archaeological demography. Age-at-death 
distributions in living populations are U-shaped, with larger numbers of deaths in the youngest 
and oldest age groups. Cemetery populations generally have too many prime age adults for 
normal attritional demographic processes. Biases created by preservational factors or the 
exclusion of certain age groups from an archaeologically recognisable burial clearly have a 
potential role here. However, Keckler [39] showed by simulation that in a population history 
where growing populations are intermittently hit by what he called ‘decimation events’ the 
element of catastrophic mortality introduced by the crashes would produce the observed 
cemetery patterns of larger than expected proportions of adults. A saw-tooth pattern of 
oscillations around a carrying-capacity would also result, and given the episodic short-lived 
nature of these decimation events would have the interesting and counter-intuitive 
consequence that populations would be growing most of the time. 
Tallavaara and Jørgensen’s paper addresses the important question of whether we can get at 
such short-term growth rates archaeologically. They show that population growth rates derived 
from archaeological data are on average an order of magnitude lower than those derived from 
ethnographic data or from the documented historical demography data of recent centuries. 
They argue that this arises because of the time-averaged nature of the archaeological record, 
which does not provide us with the resolution to identify changing growth rates but rather is 
telling us about longer term changes in mean population size that reflect changing carrying 
capacities mostly affected by environmental productivity. McLaughlin et al.’s study of Atlantic 
Iberia provides a very good example of this, using a variety of lines of evidence to show how a 
series of environmental fluctuations was linked to lagged population changes, while the 
formation of new maritime environments after 8.2 kya provided productive resources that had 
not previously existed, whose exploitation led to major population growth. In a similar vein, 
Timpson et al. show that the phase of rapid population growth in the South American Arid 
Diagonal was associated with expansion into a new niche. The following phase, on the other 
hand, corresponds to an effective equilibrium lasting 4,000 years. As the authors point out, this 
does not mean there were no short-term fluctuations over this period but the evidence 
available does not provide any support for them. 
As these papers suggest, these days there is an increasing appreciation of the importance of 
facing up to the time-averaged nature of the archaeological record for many if not most of the 
topics that interest archaeologists. In particular, rates of change in both cultural and biological 
phenomena are inversely correlated with the length of time over which they are measured [40]. 
These and related problems affecting inferences about long-term changes in patterns of human 
activity are addressed by Bevan and Crema in their paper [41]. Measurement of rates depends 
on the scale of scale of chronological resolution available to us. This is why radiocarbon date 
distributions are so important because they provide the highest level of resolution generally 
available, so long, of course, as they really are a proxy for what we are trying to measure.  
In the light of the conclusion of Tallavaara and Jørgensen [33] that archaeological temporal 
resolution is not generally good enough to tell us about instantaneous growth and decline rates, 
it is interesting that Porčić et al.’s [32] calculation of a growth rate for incoming farming 
populations in the Central Balkans over ~200 years produces estimates of well over 1%, entirely 
compatible with ethnographic rates and resulting from the much higher carrying capacity made 
possible by farming.  It was immediately followed by a rapid drop, down to half the peak level 
within 200 years, before rising equally rapidly to another peak. The reasons remain unclear in 
this case, as Porčić et al. acknowledge, and this is true of many other such examples. Are we 
seeing an oscillating pattern of overshoot and undershoot, mass emigration to the onward-
moving agricultural frontier, the impact of disease, rapid over-exploitation of soils whose 
nutrients had been able to build over millennia and thus a carrying capacity crash, or something 
else? This is a major area for further research in understanding both the mechanisms that 
produce such fluctuations and also their social and economic consequences. 
As the resolution of the record and the sample size of sites decreases, which tends to be more 
and more the case as you go further back in time, the more Tallavaara and Jørgensen’s [33] 
claim holds true. Indeed, there comes a point where the archaeological record is being averaged 
across phases of major environmental change and therefore across different carrying capacities. 
However, one of the important results of the Schmidt et al. paper [3], and in keeping with 
French’s earlier research [42], is that we now have mutually-confirming lines of archaeological 
evidence with sufficient resolution to identify regional population fluctuations across a period of 
30,000 years. Moreover, this is in keeping with the genomic record for episodes of Palaeolithic 
population replacement, though Loog [43] rightly cautions us about the problems involved in 
using genetic data to inform about changing population sizes. Of course, as we have seen, the 
ethnographic and simulation studies mentioned above strongly suggest that the real pattern is 
one of short-term fluctuations around a mean value determined by environmental productivity. 
However, in future we can potentially bridge the gap between the two by means of simulation, 
aided by the fact that the environmental record is increasingly high resolution well back into the 
past, even when the archaeological record is not.  
However, we also still need more work on explaining why specific carrying capacities are what 
they are. One example of the issue is pointed out by Schmidt et al. [3] and emerges from their 
spatial approach. In the case of the first farmers in Central Europe a variety of lines of evidence 
confirm that regional populations grew to a peak and then declined, but even at the peak it 
seems that there were areas whose temperature, precipitation and soil conditions were ideal 
for their farming system, i.e. they were exactly the same as areas that were extensively 
occupied, but remained empty. What was it about the day-to-day and year-to-year processes of 
subsistence and social relations that led to births and deaths coming into equilibrium when they 
did? 
Or maybe equilibrium conveys the wrong impression. Puleston et al.’s [44] simulation study 
used a detailed bottom-up population ecology model to examine the way a carrying capacity 
emerges from the operation of low-level processes. They modelled an age-structured 
population with given vital rates, age-related calorific needs and labour capacity colonising a 
new area with a given area of agricultural land with a given potential, examining the relationship 
between the total calorific needs of the population and the total calories available as the 
population grew.  In contrast to the standard logistic model, which assumes that an equilibrium 
is reached, with growth rates gradually slowing down and population slowly levelling off, what 
emerges is very different. Exponential population growth continues at the maximum rate then 
comes to a sudden stop as the food ratio, the total food calories available divided by the total 
required, drops below unity. This leads, without warning, to a transition phase in which fertility 
rates and probability of infant survival suddenly drop and mortality rates sharply increase, 
heralding the beginning of an indefinite Malthusian phase of reduced fertility, increased 
mortality and varying degrees of hunger. The higher the fertility and the lower the mortality in 
the growth or copial phase, when quality of life is high, the greater the shock in terms of 
reduction in fertility and life expectancy as the limit suddenly hits. Importantly, the transition is 
not the result of any new external stimulus but of the endogenous processes in the model. 
Moreover, the Malthusian phase can result in deleterious social effects, like warfare, that 
exacerbate already poor conditions. At first sight the observation mentioned of unused areas at 
the population peak of Central Europe’s first farmers appears in conflict with the assumptions of 
this ‘invisible cliff’ model but that does not mean that its bottom-up modelling approach is not a 
productive one to explore further. Indeed, even in the case of the Central European farmers it is 
striking that the later phase of population decline has evidence of massacres in several regions 
[45]. 
Archaeology, demography and life history theory 
This recent archaeological work therefore proves Malthus was right. In his 1798 ‘Essay on the 
Principle of Population’, he predicted that rapid human population growth would continually 
outgrow its resource base, leading to inevitable boom-bust cycles of population growth 
followed by decline, with mortality crises and drops in fertility levelling the population whenever 
it grew beyond environmental carrying capacity or when carrying capacity declined. As a result, 
human population growth over the long-term was very low, though not zero. Our behavioural 
flexibility and reliance on culture meant that we were sometimes able to partly escape from this 
‘Malthusian trap’ by migrating into new environments – our species very successfully colonised 
almost the entire globe while we were largely hunter-gatherers. Indeed, the rapid population 
growth rates during colonisation episodes that have been revealed in some of these papers 
confirm the reproductive success of such dispersal strategies [46]. We have also been able to 
occasionally increase environmental carrying capacity by developing new ways of capturing 
energy from the environment, which had particularly significant influences unleashing long-term 
population growth after the development of agriculture and the industrial revolution.  
Can the past tell us anything useful about the future? Are we doomed to a Malthusian cycle 
forever, or was Malthus mistaken to think that our species will be caught perpetually in such a 
trap? This debate has raged pretty much since Malthus’ time without resolution [47, 48]. So far, 
human populations have continued to grow very dramatically since the Industrial Revolution – 
global population has more than doubled in just the time the authors of this article have been 
alive – but predictions are repeatedly made that global population numbers will crash, or at 
least that population growth will soon slow down. Population growth rates are in fact now 
declining, having peaked in the 1960s, though population momentum means global population 
size is likely to grow significantly at least into the near future; most predictions suggesting a 
peak of around 9-10 billion later this century [49, 50].  
These models, however, hinge on what will happen to fertility in the near future. Global fertility 
has now declined to just 2.3 children per woman, from levels of perhaps 6 children per woman 
on average before the demographic transition. Yet, fertility has proved rather difficult for 
demographers to predict. Implicit assumptions underlying the demographic transition model 
have tended to suggest that fertility should decline continually from high pre-transition levels to 
around 2 children per women, and then hover around that figure, maintaining populations in 
equilibrium (in low mortality populations, fertility of around 2 children per women will maintain 
constant population size). But once it began to decline, fertility dropped quickly to low levels in 
Western Europe, falling below replacement levels in some populations between the two world 
wars, but then rebounded to produce the ‘baby boom’ of the 60s [51]. Later in the 20th century, 
fertility rate dropped to very low levels, just over one child on average per women in some 
countries, but then seemed to rebound in the populations with the very highest levels of 
economic development in the 21st century (in northern Europe ([52] but see [53] for an 
alternative explanation). Very recently, however, northern Europe has seen unexpected sudden 
drops in fertility [54].  
These significant fluctuations in fertility may suggest a break from Malthus’ model in that, in 
pre-Malthusian time, he suggested it was largely mortality crises – caused by food shortages, 
epidemics and warfare – which resulted in ‘depopulation’. While the archaeological record 
provides some evidence of, for example, warfare in support of this model, it is better on the 
whole at providing information on aggregate population growth and decline rates than 
mortality levels or patterns. Demographic records from the more recent past provide clear 
evidence of mortality rates which can fluctuate quite substantially over time, however, because 
of such mortality crises [55]. Since the Industrial Revolution, we have achieved remarkable 
success in reducing mortality rates and in preventing such crises, to the point that our mortality 
profiles are now so different from those of pre-demographic transition populations that Burger 
[56] has suggested these profiles appear to be from entirely different species. This might 
suggest that future mortality crises are unlikely, though perhaps should not be discounted, given 
the anthropogenic change which now appears to be wreaking havoc on our environment. 
Fertility seems to have become more variable during the demographic transition, however, as 
suggested by the patterns in Europe described above. Most demographic projections now 
regard changes in fertility as more likely to drive slowing population growth and ultimately 
produce global population equilibrium, rather than increases in mortality. 
But should we expect global population to permanently stabilise with births and deaths roughly 
in equilibrium? On archaeological timescales, the Industrial Revolution was very recent, so we 
could be in the middle of just another boom/bust cycle right now – it is not necessarily the case 
that the Industrial Revolution allowed us to escape the Malthusian trap, and we may continue 
to experience boom/bust cycles of population growth into the future. Ultimately, what pre-
transition fluctuations in mortality and post-transition fluctuations in fertility may indicate is 
that demographic patterns in our species are hard to predict, at least in the short term. In other 
words, they are stochastic. This fits with models using life history theory from biology, which 
suggest that primate life histories in general, and perhaps human life histories in particular, are 
adapted to variable environments, meaning that demographic patterns will likely vary with 
environmental stochasticity [57]. It has even been suggested that human reproductive patterns, 
which allow rapid population growth, enable us to ‘colonise’ new environments very 
successfully [46], even if rapid population growth must inevitably be followed by population 
decline as we hit the ceiling of carrying capacity in new environments.  
Comparative work with primates suggests the factor which might be particularly important in 
allowing our species not just to cope with environmental variability without risk of extinction, 
but to flourish and become the world’s most successful primate: this factor might be our habit 
of ‘pooling energy budgets’ when it comes to raising offspring [58]. Human mothers can 
maintain high fertility rates because they do not have to bear the costs of reproduction alone 
[59]. Our species engages in substantial intergenerational transfers, meaning both the 
grandparental and child generation contribute help to the parental generation in raising children 
[60]. However, these patterns of helping do show some variation between and within 
populations [61, 62]; they may partly be a response to environmental variability, but may also 
contribute to different demographic schedules [63], perhaps providing an explanation for 
variation in the archaeological record in terms of differential distribution patterns across 
apparently similar contexts. Further comparative work, such as detailed work which compares 
the life histories of humans with other great apes [64], might help elucidate further the 
similarities and differences between the ‘colonising ape’ which has been demographically 
successful and those ape species which have not (though admittedly current population declines 
among ape populations are complicated by anthropogenic destruction of their habitats). 
This view of our life history helps explain something which might otherwise appear puzzling to a 
biologist: humans are large mammals, with characteristically ‘slow’ life histories, meaning 
growth is slow, reproduction starts late, and reproductive events are relatively rare. The boom-
bust cycles of population growth, which appear to characterise human populations at the 
centennial scale, are more common in ‘fast’ species such as small mammals whose life history 
typically involves fast growth, early reproduction and large numbers of offspring, which results 
in rapid population growth [65]. Slow life history strategies in contrast are typically expected to 
have low population growth, and density-dependent mechanisms which keep population size 
tracking environmental carrying capacity. But slow life histories may also be favoured in 
environments which are highly variable and so which involve significant periods of population 
decline, even if overall, population growth over the long term is positive [57]. However, this 
perception of a difference may also be a matter of scale: the booms and busts of populations of 
mammals with slow life histories may occur over much longer time-intervals and need an 
archaeological vision to be perceived, suggesting further dialogue between archaeologists and 
biologists may be fruitful in understanding the evolution of human life histories. 
Returning to the future demography of our species, if we are adapted to environmental 
variability, and if our demography is similarly variable in tracking environmental shifts, perhaps 
we should not expect any stabilisation in global population in the near future. But perhaps this is 
also not necessarily a bad thing, if environmental stochasticity is exactly the condition under 
which we are adapted to thrive.         
Conclusion 
The innovative archaeological research which has recently shed light on the demographic 
patterns of our species in deep history provides support for one of the earliest and most 
influential models in demography: Malthus’ ‘pessimistic’ prediction that human populations 
were condemned to an inevitable oscillation between population growth and population decline 
around a density-dependent ceiling. Overlaid on Malthus’ pessimism, however, is the 
observation that population growth rates, in the long-term, were positive, as human 
populations repeatedly escaped from the Malthusian trap through migration to new 
environments and increasing the carrying capacity of existing environments by developing new 
methods of exploiting them that lifted the Malthusian ceiling, even if only temporarily in some 
cases. We may even owe our species’ success partly to adaptations which allowed us to thrive 
under such stochastic conditions, leading to optimism about the future of human populations, 
especially if future population fluctuations are driven more by shifts in fertility than mortality. 
Questions remain, however, about the history, and potential future, of our species. Is our 
behavioural (including cultural), and demographic, flexibility the result of these boom-bust 
cycles or the cause of them, or both? What do these fluctuating environmental conditions mean 
for our ability to understand and manage risk and unpredictability? Closer cooperation between 
archaeology and evolutionary demography might help elucidate some of these questions, 
combining a detailed understanding of demographic mechanisms and the evolutionary 
principles behind them with a longer term perspective on what has happened to populations in 
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